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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (holding in part that there was sufficient evidence to find that (i) the Army
Corps of Engineers' decision to increase water releases over a seven-year period
caused damage to valuable hardwood trees, (ii) the damage was foreseeable, and
(iii) the flooding caused by the releases was sufficient in duration and severity to
establish a temporary flowage easement constituting a compensable Fifth
Amendment taking).
The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission ("Commission") owns the Dave
Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area ("Management Area"), a
large parcel of land along the Black River in northeastern Arkansas. The Commission uses the area as a timber resource and a wildlife and hunting preserve.
Three main species of hardwood trees populate the Management Area: nuttall
oaks, overcup oaks, and willow oaks. These valuable species of hardwood trees
can withstand short periods of flooding during the growing season, but not more
than two or three successive seasons of prolonged flooding.
In the 1940s the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps) built the Clearwater
Dam upstream of the Management Area to provide flood control. The Clearwater Lake Water Control Manual ("Manual"), which set the policy for water
releases from the dam into the Black River, attempted to mimic the natural flow
of water in the Black River while preventing severe floods. Under this policy,
the floodwaters downstream of the dam usually receded by late May of each
year and did not interfere with the tree-growing season from April to October.
The Manual reserved to the Corps the right to approve deviations from the
normal pattern of water releases. Consequently, in 1993 the Corps approved a
series of deviations modifying the release times in response to requests from
agricultural interests seeking to provide farmers in the flood-affected regions
with a longer period of time to harvest their crops. The deviations resulted in
an increase in the number of days that portions of the Management Area
flooded during the growing seasons from 1994 to 2000.
The Corps continued to implement the new policy until 2000 in spite of the
Commission's complaints starting in 1996 that the extended flooding was damaging some of the valuable hardwoods. In 1999 and 2000 the area suffered a
moderate drought. After the drought, the Commission found that large numbers of their most valuable hardwood species were dead or degraded. The
Commission asserted that the extended periods of flooding between 1994 and
1998 damaged the root systems of the trees so that they were not able to withstand the drought.
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In April 2001 the Corps decided to end the deviations altogether instead of
adopting them permanently. The Corps noted that the deviations had caused
the Management Area to flood frequently during the previous six years, and it
stated that it was abandoning the deviations because of concern for the "potential for.damage to the bottomland hardwoods" in the Management Area.
The Commission originally brought this action in the Court of Federal
Claims ("claims court") alleging that the Corps' water release practices between
1993 and 2000 constituted a compensable Fifth Amendment taking. The
claims court agreed and found that (i) the post-1993 deviations constituted a
temporary flowage easement over the Management Area, (ii) the extended periods of flooding in parts of the Management Area were foreseeable, and (iii)
the floods were the cause of the damage to the timber in those areas. The claims
court accordingly awarded the Commission about $5.6 million for the value of
the timber lost plus approximately $176,000 in damages to pay for regeneration
efforts in areas where wetland plant species had invaded as a result of the floodmg.
The Unites States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("court") originally reversed, holding that the government's actions did not constitute a compensable taking. The court relied on several Supreme Court cases suggesting
that temporary flooding did not constitute a compensable taking.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court's decision.
The Supreme Court held that government-induced flooding can constitute a
compensable taking even if it is temporary in duration. The Court held that to
determine whether a taking has occurred, a court must consider (i) whether authorized government action caused the injury, (ii)whether the injury was a foreseeable result of that action, and (iii) whether the injury constituted a sufficiently
severe invasion that interfered with the landowner's reasonable expectations as
to the use of the land. Because the government challenged several of the claims
court's factual findings, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings.
On remand, the court addressed the government's arguments as to duration, causation, foreseeability, and severity.
The court first addressed the government's contention that the deviations
were "temporary and ad hoc" and therefore did not constitute a compensable
taking of the Commission's property. The court noted that in light of the Supreme Court decision that a physical taking could result from temporary flooding, the government's argument was necessarily limited to whether the flooding
was sufficient in duration to constitute a taking. The government argued it renewed the deviations on a yearly basis and designated them as temporary, meaning they were not part of a multi-year plan. However, the court concluded that
because the yearly deviations had a single purpose and a consistent impact on
the Management Area, the proper characterization of the invasion was that it
lasted for seven years. Thus, the court also held this was a sufficient duration to
subject the government to takings liability.
Second, the court addressed the government's argument that the claims
court erred in finding that the deviations caused a significant increase in the
burden of flooding on the Management Area. The court concluded that while
there was conflicting evidence on causation, there was sufficient evidence in the
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record to support the claims court's conclusion. Specifically, the court noted
testimony by the Commissioner's expert that (i) the deviations, and not any
other occurrence, were the direct causes of the flooding, and (ii) the flooding,
and no other factor, was the direct cause of the damage to the Commission's
timber. Additionally, the court noted evidence in the record that in 2001, following a site visit to the Management Area, the Corps itself admitted that the
deviations had "clear potential for damage to bottomland hardwoods."
The Court next addressed the government's argument that the Corps did
not intentionally flood the Management Area and that the flooding was not a
foreseeable result of the deviations. The court upheld the claims court's conclusion that a reasonable investigation by the Corps prior to implementing the
deviations would have revealed that the deviations would result in a significant
increase in the number of days of flooding in the Management Area. The court
again pointed to the Corps' own investigation and conclusion in 2001 not to
make the deviations permanent and agreed with the claims court that, had the
Corp conducted such an investigation prior to implementing the deviations in
1993, it would have reached the same result.
Finally, the court addressed the government's two severity arguments. First,
the government argued that the marginal increase in flooding did not constitute
a sufficiently severe invasion of the Commission's property rights to support a
claim for compensable taking. The court upheld the claims court's decision
that the government's intrusion was sufficiently severe to uphold a takings claim.
The court pointed to the claims court's factual findings that after the deviations
began the flooding lasted for significantly longer periods of time and had more
serious consequences than pre-deviation flooding. The Court also relied on the
Supreme Court's conclusion, based on those factual findings, that the deviations
deprived the Commission "of the customary use of the Management Area as a
forest and wildlife preserve."
Second, the government argued that the effect of the flooding was irrelevant
to the question of whether the governmental action itself-making deviations that
resulted in additional flooding-constituted a taking. The court disagreed and
stated that a consideration of the effects of an intrusion is often necessary to
determine whether a particular intrusion is sufficiently severe or only incremental in nature.
Lastly, the court addressed the Commission's argument that the claims
court erred in its calculation of damages. The Commission argued that invasive
wetland species took hold in parts of the Management Area as a result of the
flooding, and that the court should have granted additional damages for the regeneration of these lands. The Commission asserted that 6,641 acres were in
need of regeneration, but the claims court only awarded regeneration damages
for the 349 acres on which the Commission characterized the timber damage as
"severe." For the remaining acres, the claims court found that the Commission
had not established the need for regeneration "to a reasonable certainty."
The Commission put forward two main arguments. First, the Commission
argued that a plaintiff bears the less exacting burden of proving "a fair and reasonable approximation" of damages and, therefore, the claims court applied an
unduly heavy burden. The court held that the principle of reasonable certainty,
just like the Commissions proposed test, would not require a plaintiff to prove
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the precise amount of damages; both tests require the plaintiff to show the
amount of damages to a reasonable approximation.
The Commission also argued that the evidence that the claims court relied
upon in granting damages for the 349 acres was not materially different than the
evidence with regard to the remaining portions. The court noted that the claims
court found that the Commission had not presented adequate evidence to differentiate which of the remaining acreage would require regenerative work and
which retained oak stands that may well regenerate themselves. The court held
that the claims court did not commit clear error in finding that the Commission
failed to meet its burden in this regard.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the claims court's original ruling that the
government took a temporary flowage easement over the Management Area
that constituted a compensable Fifth Amendment taking, and upheld the claims
court's calculation of damages to the Commission.
DaleRadiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
San Luis &Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v.Jewell, No. 1: 13-CV01232-LJOGSA, 969 F.Supp 2d 1211 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (lifting a Temporary Restraining Order and denying a motion for preliminary injunction, thereby permitting the United States Department of the Interior to perform flow augmentation releases of water from Trinity Reservoir to combat a potential parasitic
fish kill).
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority and Westlands Water District
("San Luis") sought to enjoin the United States Department of the Interior and
Unites States Bureau of Reclamation ("Interior") from making flow augmentation releases of water from Trinity Reservoir to the Trinity and Klamath Rivers
in California. The Trinity River Division ("TRD"), a component of the Central
Valley Project, dams the Trinity River at Trinity Reservoir. The Klamath Project dams the Klamath River. The court noted that the construction and operation of these projects had severely altered the environment and degraded fish
habitat. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
("court") originally issued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), which prevented the flow augmentation until the court had an opportunity to consider
whether to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction.
To evaluate San Luis' motion for preliminary injunction, the court turned
to the injunction test found in Winter v. NaturalResources Defense Counc,

Inc. That test states a party seeking an injunction must show (i) it is likely to
succeed on the merits, (ii) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of relief, (iii) the balance of equities tip in its favor, and (iv)an injunction is in
the public interest.
Interior claimed the purpose of the flow augmentation was to reduce the
likelihood and severity of a fish kill in 2013. San Luis argued that Interior (i)
did not have authority to make flow augmentation releases in excess of those
permitted by the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA"); (ii) failed

